Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/787

Labeled PSI from Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Malicious Security

Hao Chen and Zhicong Huang and Kim Laine and Peter Rindal

Abstract: Private Set Intersection (PSI) allows two parties, the sender and the receiver, to compute the intersection of their private sets without revealing extra information to each other. We are interested in the {\it unbalanced} PSI setting, where (1) the receiver's set is significantly smaller than the sender's, and (2) the receiver (with the smaller set) has a low-power device. Also, in a {\it Labeled PSI} setting, the sender holds a label per each item in its set, and the receiver obtains the labels from the items in the intersection. We build upon the unbalanced PSI protocol of Chen, Laine, and Rindal (CCS~2017) in several ways: we add efficient support for arbitrary length items, we construct and implement an unbalanced Labeled PSI protocol with small communication complexity, and also strengthen the security model using Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function (OPRF) in a pre-processing phase. Our protocols outperform previous ones: for an intersection of $2^{20}$ and $512$ size sets of arbitrary length items our protocol has a total online running time of just $1$~second (single thread), and a total communication cost of $4$~MB. For a larger example, an intersection of $2^{28}$ and $1024$ size sets of arbitrary length items has an online running time of $12$ seconds (multi-threaded), with less than $18$~MB of total communication.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / private set intersection; homomorphic encryption

Original Publication (with minor differences): CCS 2018
DOI:
10.1145/3243734.3243836

Date: received 27 Aug 2018

Contact author: kim laine at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180901:024333 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/787


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