Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/778

PPP-Completeness with Connections to Cryptography

Katerina Sotiraki and Manolis Zampetakis and Giorgos Zirdelis

Abstract: Polynomial Pigeonhole Principle (PPP) is an important subclass of TFNP with profound connections to the complexity of the fundamental cryptographic primitives: collision-resistant hash functions and one-way permutations. In contrast to most of the other subclasses of TFNP, no complete problem is known for PPP. Our work identifies the first PPP-complete problem without any circuit or Turing Machine given explicitly in the input, and thus we answer a longstanding open question from [Papadimitriou1994]. Specifically, we show that constrained-SIS (cSIS), a generalized version of the well-known Short Integer Solution problem (SIS) from lattice-based cryptography, is PPP-complete.

In order to give intuition behind our reduction for constrained-SIS, we identify another PPP-complete problem with a circuit in the input but closely related to lattice problems. We call this problem BLICHFELDT and it is the computational problem associated with Blichfeldt's fundamental theorem in the theory of lattices.

Building on the inherent connection of PPP with collision-resistant hash functions, we use our completeness result to construct the first natural hash function family that captures the hardness of all collision-resistant hash functions in a worst-case sense, i.e. it is natural and universal in the worst-case. The close resemblance of our hash function family with SIS, leads us to the first candidate collision-resistant hash function that is both natural and universal in an average-case sense.

Finally, our results enrich our understanding of the connections between PPP, lattice problems and other concrete cryptographic assumptions, such as the discrete logarithm problem over general groups.

Category / Keywords: complexity of total search problems; pigeonhole principle; collision resistant hash functions; short integer solutions;

Original Publication (with major differences): 59th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2018)

Date: received 15 Aug 2018, last revised 30 Aug 2018

Contact author: manoszambe at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180901:022846 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/778


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