Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/755

Simulation-Based Selective Opening Security for Receivers under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

Zhengan Huang and Junzuo Lai and Wenbin Chen and Man Ho Au and Zhen Peng and Jin Li

Abstract: Security against selective opening attack (SOA) for receivers requires that in a multi-user setting, even if an adversary has access to all ciphertexts, and adaptively corrupts some fraction of the users to obtain the decryption keys corresponding to some of the ciphertexts, the remaining (potentially related) ciphertexts retain their privacy. In this paper, we study simulation-based selective opening security for receivers of public key encryption (PKE) schemes under chosen-ciphertext attacks (RSIM-SO-CCA).

Concretely, we first show that some known PKE schemes meet RSIM-SO-CCA security. Then, we introduce the notion of master-key SOA security for identity-based encryption (IBE), and extend the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transformation to show generic PKE constructions achieving RSIM-SO-CCA security. Finally, we show how to construct an IBE scheme achieving master-key SOA security.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / simulation-based security, selective opening security for receivers, chosen-ciphertext attacks, public-key encryption, identity-based encryption

Original Publication (with minor differences): Designs, Codes and Cryptography
DOI:
10.1007/s10623-018-0530-1

Date: received 16 Aug 2018

Contact author: zhahuang sjtu at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180820:181304 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/755


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