Paper 2018/753

Decentralized Policy-Hiding Attribute-Based Encryption with Receiver Privacy

Yan Michalevsky and Marc Joye

Abstract

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) enables limiting access to encrypted data to users with certain attributes. Different aspects of ABE were studied, such as the multi-authority setting (MA-ABE), and policy hiding, meaning the access policy is unknown to unauthorized parties. However, no practical scheme so far provably provides both properties, which are often desirable in real-world applications: supporting decentralization, while hiding the access policy. We present the first practical decentralized ABE scheme with a proof of being policy-hiding. Our construction is based on a decentralized inner-product predicate encryption scheme, introduced in this paper, which hides the encryption policy. It results in an ABE scheme supporting conjunctions, disjunctions and threshold policies, that protects the access policy from parties that are not authorized to decrypt the content. Further, we address the issue of receiver privacy. By using our scheme in combination with vector commitments, we hide the overall set of attributes possessed by the receiver from individual authorities, only revealing the attribute that the authority is controlling. Finally, we propose randomizing-polynomial encodings that immunize the scheme in the presence of corrupt authorities.

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Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1_27
Keywords
attribute-based encryption
Contact author(s)
yanm2 @ cs stanford edu
History
2021-11-11: last of 4 revisions
2018-08-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/753
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/753,
      author = {Yan Michalevsky and Marc Joye},
      title = {Decentralized Policy-Hiding Attribute-Based Encryption with Receiver Privacy},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/753},
      year = {2018},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-98989-1_27},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/753}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/753}
}
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