Paper 2018/748

Definitions for Plaintext-Existence Hiding in Cloud Storage

Colin Boyd, Gareth T. Davies, Kristian Gjøsteen, Håvard Raddum, and Mohsen Toorani

Abstract

Cloud storage services use deduplication for saving bandwidth and storage. An adversary can exploit side-channel information in several attack scenarios when deduplication takes place at the client side, leaking information on whether a specific plaintext exists in the cloud storage. Generalising existing security definitions, we introduce formal security games for a number of possible adversaries in this domain, and show that games representing all natural adversarial behaviors are in fact equivalent. These results allow users and practitioners alike to accurately assess the vulnerability of deployed systems to this real-world concern.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.ARES-SECPID 2018
DOI
10.1145/3230833.3234515
Contact author(s)
gareth davies @ ntnu no
History
2018-08-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/748
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/748,
      author = {Colin Boyd and Gareth T.  Davies and Kristian Gjøsteen and Håvard Raddum and Mohsen Toorani},
      title = {Definitions for Plaintext-Existence Hiding in Cloud Storage},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/748},
      year = {2018},
      doi = {10.1145/3230833.3234515},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/748}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/748}
}
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