Paper 2018/734
Random Number Generators Can Be Fooled to Behave Badly
George Teseleanu
Abstract
In this paper, we extend the work on purely mathematical Trojan horses initially presented by Young and Yung. This kind of mechanism affects the statistical properties of an infected random number generator (RNG) by making it very sensitive to input entropy. Thereby, when inputs have the correct distribution the Trojan has no effect, but when the distribution becomes biased the Trojan worsens it. Besides its obvious malicious usage, this mechanism can also be applied to devise lightweight health tests for RNGs. Currently, RNG designs are required to implement an early detection mechanism for entropy failure, and this class of Trojan horses is perfect for this job.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ICICS
- Keywords
- backdoorrandom number generatorshealth tests
- Contact author(s)
- george teseleanu @ yahoo com
- History
- 2018-08-15: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/734
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/734, author = {George Teseleanu}, title = {Random Number Generators Can Be Fooled to Behave Badly}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/734}, year = {2018}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/734} }