Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/730

Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Authenticated Key Exchange

Atsushi Fujioka and Katsuyuki Takashima and Shintaro Terada and Kazuki Yoneyama

Abstract: We propose two authenticated key exchange protocols from supersingular isogenies. Our protocols are the first post-quantum one-round Diffie-Hellman type authenticated key exchange ones in the following points: one is secure under the quantum random oracle model and the other resists against maximum exposure where a non-trivial combination of secret keys is revealed. The security of the former and the latter is proven under isogeny versions of the decisional and gap Diffie-Hellman assumptions, respectively. We also propose a new approach for invalidating the Galbraith-Vercauteren-type attack for the gap problem.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / one-round authenticated key exchange, supersingular isogeny decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, degree-insensitive supersingular isogeny gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, CK model, CK^+ model, quantum adversary

Original Publication (with major differences): ICISC 2018

Date: received 7 Aug 2018, last revised 2 Nov 2018

Contact author: Takashima Katsuyuki at aj MitsubishiElectric co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This is the full version of a paper appearing in ICISC 2018, the 21st Annual International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, November 28-30, 2018, Seoul, Korea.

Version: 20181102:084227 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/730


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