Paper 2018/730

Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Authenticated Key Exchange

Atsushi Fujioka, Katsuyuki Takashima, Shintaro Terada, and Kazuki Yoneyama

Abstract

We propose two authenticated key exchange protocols from supersingular isogenies. Our protocols are the first post-quantum one-round Diffie-Hellman type authenticated key exchange ones in the following points: one is secure under the quantum random oracle model and the other resists against maximum exposure where a non-trivial combination of secret keys is revealed. The security of the former and the latter is proven under isogeny versions of the decisional and gap Diffie-Hellman assumptions, respectively. We also propose a new approach for invalidating the Galbraith-Vercauteren-type attack for the gap problem.

Note: This is the full version of a paper appearing in ICISC 2018, the 21st Annual International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, November 28-30, 2018, Seoul, Korea.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.ICISC 2018
Keywords
one-round authenticated key exchangeCK modelCK^+ modelquantum adversary
Contact author(s)
Takashima Katsuyuki @ aj mitsubishielectric co jp
History
2018-11-02: last of 4 revisions
2018-08-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/730
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/730,
      author = {Atsushi Fujioka and Katsuyuki Takashima and Shintaro Terada and Kazuki Yoneyama},
      title = {Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Authenticated Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/730},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/730}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/730}
}
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