Paper 2018/698

Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption

David Cash, Feng-Hao Liu, Adam O'Neill, Mark Zhandry, and Cong Zhang


Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a popular primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases, as it allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Order Revealing Encryption
Contact author(s)
congresearch @ gmail com
mzhandry @ princeton edu
davidcash @ cs uchicago edu
amoneill @ gmail com
fenghao liu @ fau edu
2018-07-24: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {David Cash and Feng-Hao Liu and Adam O'Neill and Mark Zhandry and Cong Zhang},
      title = {Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/698},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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