Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption

David Cash; Feng-Hao Liu; Adam O'Neill; Mark Zhandry; Cong Zhang

Paper 2018/698

Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption

David Cash, Feng-Hao Liu, Adam O'Neill, Mark Zhandry, and Cong Zhang

Abstract

Order-revealing encryption (ORE) is a popular primitive for outsourcing encrypted databases, as it allows for efficiently performing range queries over encrypted data. Unfortunately, a series of works, starting with Naveed et al. (CCS 2015), have shown that when the adversary has a good estimate of the distribution of the data, ORE provides little protection. In this work, we consider the case that the database entries are drawn identically and independently from a distribution of known shape, but for which the mean and variance are not (and thus the attacks of Naveed et al. do not apply). We define a new notion of security for ORE, called parameter-hiding ORE, which maintains the secrecy of these parameters. We give a construction of ORE satisfying our new definition from bilinear maps.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Order Revealing Encryption
Contact author(s): congresearch @ gmail com
mzhandry @ princeton edu
davidcash @ cs uchicago edu
amoneill @ gmail com
fenghao liu @ fau edu
History: 2018-07-24: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/698
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/698,
      author = {David Cash and Feng-Hao Liu and Adam O'Neill and Mark Zhandry and Cong Zhang},
      title = {Parameter-Hiding Order Revealing Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/698},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/698}
}