Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/651

Side-Channel Analysis of SM2: A Late-Stage Featurization Case Study

Nicola Tuveri and Sohaib ul Hassan and Cesar Pereida García and Billy Brumley

Abstract: SM2 is a public key cryptography suite originating from Chinese standards, including digital signatures and public key encryption. Ahead of schedule, code for this functionality was recently mainlined in OpenSSL, marked for the upcoming 1.1.1 release. We perform a security review of this implementation, uncovering various deficiencies ranging from traditional software quality issues to side-channel risks. To assess the latter, we carry out a side-channel security evaluation and discover that the implementation hits every pitfall seen for OpenSSL's ECDSA code in the past decade. We carry out remote timings, cache timings, and EM analysis, with accompanying empirical data to demonstrate secret information leakage during execution of both digital signature generation and public key decryption. Finally, we propose, implement, and empirically evaluate countermeasures.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / applied cryptography; public-key cryptography; side-channel analysis; timing attacks; cache-timing attacks; power analysis; TVLA; SM2; OpenSSL; applied cryptography; cryptanalysis;

Original Publication (in the same form): 2018 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC ’18), December 3–7, 2018, San Juan, PR, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 14 pages
DOI:
10.1145/3274694.3274725

Date: received 1 Jul 2018, last revised 21 Dec 2018

Contact author: nicola tuveri at tut fi

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Revised with the final version published as open access in the proceedings.

Version: 20181221:134532 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/651


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