Paper 2018/644
Hide The Modulus: A Secure Non-Interactive Fully Verifiable Delegation Scheme for Modular Exponentiations via CRT
Osmanbey Uzunkol, Jothi Rangasamy, and Lakshmi Kuppusamy
Abstract
Security protocols using public-key cryptography often requires large number of costly modular exponentiations (MEs). With the
proliferation of resource-constrained (mobile) devices and advancements in cloud computing, delegation of such expensive computations to powerful server providers has gained lots of attention. In this paper, we address the problem of verifiably secure delegation of MEs using two servers, where at most one of which is assumed to be malicious (the OMTUP-model). We first show verifiability issues of two recent schemes: We show that a scheme from IndoCrypt 2016 does not offer full verifiability, and that a scheme for
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. 21st Information Security Conference (ISC 2018)
- Keywords
- Verifiable and secure delegationmodular exponentiationscloud securitylightweight cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- osmanbey uzunkol @ gmail com
- History
- 2018-07-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/644
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/644, author = {Osmanbey Uzunkol and Jothi Rangasamy and Lakshmi Kuppusamy}, title = {Hide The Modulus: A Secure Non-Interactive Fully Verifiable Delegation Scheme for Modular Exponentiations via {CRT}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/644}, year = {2018}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/644} }