Paper 2018/618

On some methods for constructing almost optimal S-Boxes and their resilience against side-channel attacks

Reynier Antonio de la Cruz Jiménez

Abstract

Substitution Boxes (S-Boxes) are crucial components in the design of many symmetric ciphers. The security of these ciphers against linear, differential, algebraic cryptanalyses and side-channel attacks is then strongly dependent on the choice of the S-Boxes. To construct S-Boxes having good resistive properties both towards classical cryptanalysis as well side-channel attacks is not a trivial task. In this article we propose new methods for generating S-Boxes with strong cryptographic properties and therefore study the resilience of such S-Boxes against side-channel attacks in terms of its theoretical metrics and masking possibility.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
S-Boxpermutationshamming weightnonlinearitydiffer ential uniformitygraph algebraic immunitydifferential power analysistransparency orderconfusion coefficientsignal-to-noise ratio.
Contact author(s)
djr antonio537 @ gmail com
History
2018-06-22: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/618
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/618,
      author = {Reynier Antonio de la Cruz Jiménez},
      title = {On some methods for constructing almost optimal S-Boxes and their resilience against side-channel attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/618},
      year = {2018},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/618}
}
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