Paper 2018/618
On some methods for constructing almost optimal S-Boxes and their resilience against side-channel attacks
Reynier Antonio de la Cruz Jiménez
Abstract
Substitution Boxes (S-Boxes) are crucial components in the design of many symmetric ciphers. The security of these ciphers against linear, differential, algebraic cryptanalyses and side-channel attacks is then strongly dependent on the choice of the S-Boxes. To construct S-Boxes having good resistive properties both towards classical cryptanalysis as well side-channel attacks is not a trivial task. In this article we propose new methods for generating S-Boxes with strong cryptographic properties and therefore study the resilience of such S-Boxes against side-channel attacks in terms of its theoretical metrics and masking possibility.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- S-Boxpermutationshamming weightnonlinearitydiffer ential uniformitygraph algebraic immunitydifferential power analysistransparency orderconfusion coefficientsignal-to-noise ratio.
- Contact author(s)
- djr antonio537 @ gmail com
- History
- 2018-06-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/618
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/618,
author = {Reynier Antonio de la Cruz Jiménez},
title = {On some methods for constructing almost optimal S-Boxes and their resilience against side-channel attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/618},
year = {2018},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/618}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/618}
}
