Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/606

Continuously Non-Malleable Codes with Split-State Refresh

Antonio Faonio and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Mark Simkin and Daniele Venturi

Abstract: Non-malleable codes for the split-state model allow to encode a message into two parts, such that arbitrary independent tampering on each part, and subsequent decoding of the corresponding modified codeword, yields either the same as the original message, or a completely unrelated value. Continuously non-malleable codes further allow to tolerate an unbounded (polynomial) number of tampering attempts, until a decoding error happens. The drawback is that, after an error happens, the system must self-destruct and stop working, otherwise generic attacks become possible.

In this paper we propose a solution to this limitation, by leveraging a split-state refreshing procedure. Namely, whenever a decoding error happens, the two parts of an encoding can be locally refreshed (i.e.,\ without any interaction), which allows to avoid the self-destruct mechanism in some applications. Additionally, the refreshing procedure can be exploited in order to obtain security against continual leakage attacks. We give an abstract framework for building refreshable continuously non-malleable codes in the common reference string model, and provide a concrete instantiation based on the external Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Finally, we explore applications in which our notion turns out to be essential. The first application is a signature scheme tolerating an arbitrary polynomial number of split-state tampering attempts, without requiring a self-destruct capability, and in a model where refreshing of the memory happens only after an invalid output is produced. This circumvents an impossibility result from a recent work by Fuijisaki and Xagawa (Asiacrypt 2016). The second application is a compiler for tamper-resilient read-only RAM programs. In comparison to other tamper-resilient RAM compilers, ours has several advantages, among which the fact that, in some cases, it does not rely on the self-destruct feature.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / non-malleable codes; tamper-resilient cryptography; split-state model

Original Publication (with major differences): ACNS'18

Date: received 15 Jun 2018

Contact author: antonio faonio at imdea org

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180618:193343 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/606


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