Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/588

BISEN: Efficient Boolean Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Verifiability and Minimal Leakage

Guilherme Borges and Henrique Domingos and Bernardo Ferreira and João Leitão and Tiago Oliveira and Bernardo Portela

Abstract: The prevalence and availability of cloud infrastructures has made them the de facto solution for storing and archiving data, both for organizations and individual users. Nonetheless, the cloud's wide spread adoption is still hindered by data privacy and security concerns, particularly in applications with large data collections where efficient search and retrieval services are also major requirements. This leads to increased tension between security, efficiency, and search expressiveness, which current state of art solutions try to balance through complex cryptographic protocols that sacrifice efficiency and expressiveness for near optimal security.

In this paper we tackle this tension by proposing BISEN, a new provably-secure boolean searchable symmetric encryption scheme that improves these three complementary dimensions by exploring the design space of isolation guarantees offered by novel commodity hardware such as Intel SGX, abstracted as Isolated Execution Environments (IEEs). BISEN is the first scheme to enable highly expressive and arbitrarily complex boolean queries, with minimal leakage of information regarding performed queries and accessed data. Furthermore, by exploiting trusted hardware and the IEE abstraction, BISEN reduces communication costs between the client and the cloud, boosting query execution performance. Experimental validation and comparison with the state of art shows that BISEN provides better performance with enriched search semantics and security

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Searchable Symmetric Encryption, Trusted Hardware, Cloud Computing, Provable Security

Date: received 7 Jun 2018, last revised 19 Jun 2018

Contact author: blfp at inesctec pt

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180619:133639 (All versions of this report)

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