Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/543

Practical and Tightly-Secure Digital Signatures and Authenticated Key Exchange

Kristian Gjøsteen and Tibor Jager

Abstract: Tight security is increasingly gaining importance in real-world cryptography, as it allows to choose cryptographic parameters in a way that is supported by a security proof, without the need to sacrifice efficiency by compensating the security loss of a reduction with larger parameters. However, for many important cryptographic primitives, including digital signatures and authenticated key exchange (AKE), we are still lacking constructions that are suitable for real-world deployment.

We construct the first truly practical signature scheme with tight security in a real-world multi-user setting with adaptive corruptions. The scheme is based on a new way of applying the Fiat-Shamir approach to construct tightly-secure signatures from certain identification schemes.

Then we use this scheme as a building block to construct the first practical AKE protocol with tight security. It allows the establishment of a key within 1 RTT in a practical client-server setting, provides forward security, is simple and easy to implement, and thus very suitable for practical deployment. It is essentially the ``signed Diffie-Hellman'' protocol, but with an additional message, which is crucial to achieve tight security. This additional message is used to overcome a technical difficulty in constructing tightly-secure AKE protocols.

For a theoretically-sound choice of parameters and a moderate number of users and sessions, our protocol has comparable computational efficiency to the simple signed Diffie-Hellman protocol with EC-DSA, while for large-scale settings our protocol has even better computational performance, at moderately increased communication complexity.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Tight security, digital signatures, Fiat-Shamir

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-CRYPTO-2018

Date: received 1 Jun 2018

Contact author: tibor jager at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180604:215428 (All versions of this report)

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