Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/534

Cryptographic Constructions Supporting Implicit Data Integrity

Michael Kounavis and David Durham and Sergej Deutsch and Antonios Papadimitriou and Amitabh Das

Abstract: We study a methodology for supporting data integrity called 'implicit integrity' and present cryptographic constructions supporting it. Implicit integrity allows for corruption detection without producing, storing or verifying mathematical summaries of the content such as MACs and ICVs, or any other type of message expansion. As with authenticated encryption, the main idea behind this methodology is that, whereas typical user data demonstrate patterns such as repeated bytes or words, decrypted data resulting from corrupted ciphertexts no longer demonstrate such patterns. Thus, by checking the entropy of some decrypted ciphertexts, corruption can be possibly detected.

The main contribution of this paper is a new notion of security which is associated with implicit integrity, and which is different from the typical requirement that the output of cryptographic systems should be indistinguishable from the output of a random permutation. The notion of security we discuss reflects the fact that it should be computationally difficult for an adversary to corrupt some ciphertext so that the resulting plaintext demonstrates specific patterns. For this purpose, we introduce two kinds of adversaries. First, an input perturbing adversary performs content corruption attacks. Second an oracle replacing adversary performs content replay attacks. We discuss requirements for supporting implicit integrity in these two adversary models, and provide security bounds for a construction called IVP, a three-level confusion diffusion network which can support implicit integrity and is inexpensive to implement.

Category / Keywords: Data Integrity, Implicit Integrity, Observer Functions

Date: received 30 May 2018, last revised 29 Jun 2018

Contact author: michael e kounavis at intel com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: some more minor fixes

Version: 20180629:064355 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/534


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