Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/528

Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

Alain Couvreur and Matthieu Lequesne and Jean-Pierre Tillich

Abstract: We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Code-based Cryptography, McEliece encryption scheme, key recovery attack, generalised Reed Solomon codes, Schur product of codes

Date: received 29 May 2018

Contact author: matthieu lequesne at inria fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180604:211851 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/528


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