Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

Alain Couvreur; Matthieu Lequesne; Jean-Pierre Tillich

Paper 2018/528

Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time

Alain Couvreur, Matthieu Lequesne, and Jean-Pierre Tillich

Abstract

We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Code-based Cryptography McEliece encryption scheme key recovery attack generalised Reed Solomon codes Schur product of codes
Contact author(s): matthieu lequesne @ inria fr
History: 2018-06-04: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/528
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/528,
      author = {Alain Couvreur and Matthieu Lequesne and Jean-Pierre Tillich},
      title = {Recovering short secret keys of RLCE in polynomial time},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/528},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/528}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/528}
}