Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/489

Betrayal, Distrust, and Rationality: Smart Counter-Collusion Contracts for Verifiable Cloud Computing

Changyu Dong and Yilei Wang and Amjad Aldweesh and Patrick McCorry and Aad van Moorsel

Abstract: Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing need for verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation outsourced to the cloud. Existing verifiable computation techniques all have a high overhead, thus if being deployed in the clouds, would render cloud computing more expensive than the on-premises counterpart. To achieve verifiability at a reasonable cost, we leverage game theory and propose a smart contract based solution. In a nutshell, a client lets two clouds compute the same task, and uses smart contracts to stimulate tension, betrayal and distrust between the clouds, so that rational clouds will not collude and cheat. In the absence of collusion, verification of correctness can be done easily by crosschecking the results from the two clouds. We provide a formal analysis of the games induced by the contracts, and prove that the contracts will be effective under certain reasonable assumptions. By resorting to game theory and smart contracts, we are able to avoid heavy cryptographic protocols. The client only needs to pay two clouds to compute in the clear, and a small transaction fee to use the smart contracts. We also conducted a feasibility study that involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the official Ethereum network.

Category / Keywords: Verifiable Computing, Smart Contract, Game Theory, Collusion, Trust

Original Publication (with minor differences): ACM CCS 2017
DOI:
10.1145/3133956.3134032

Date: received 22 May 2018, last revised 23 May 2018

Contact author: changyu dong at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Full version of the paper.

Version: 20180523:103138 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/489


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