Paper 2018/456

An efficient structural attack on NIST submission DAGS

Elise Barelli and Alain Couvreur

Abstract

We present an efficient key recovery attack on code based encryption schemes using some quasi–dyadic alternant codes with extension degree 2. This attack permits to break the proposal DAGS recently submitted to NIST.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
cryptanalysiscode based cryptographyMcEliece
Contact author(s)
alain couvreur @ lix polytechnique fr
History
2018-05-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/456
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/456,
      author = {Elise Barelli and Alain Couvreur},
      title = {An efficient structural attack on NIST submission DAGS},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/456},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/456}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/456}
}
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