Paper 2018/444

Founding Cryptography on Smooth Projective Hashing

Bing Zeng

Abstract

Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. Halevi-Kalai OT (Halevi, S. and Y. Kalai (2012), Journal of Cryptology 25(1)), which is based on smooth projective hash(SPH), is a famous and the most efficient framework for $1$-out-of-$2$ oblivious transfer ($\mbox{OT}^{2}_{1}$) against malicious adversaries in plain model. However, it does not provide simulation-based security. Thus, it is harder to use it as a building block in secure multiparty computation (SMPC) protocols. A natural question however, which so far has not been answered, is whether it can be can be made fully-simulatable. In this paper, we give a positive answer. Further, we present a fully-simulatable framework for general $\mbox{OT}^{n}_{t}$ ($n,t\in \mathbb{N}$ and $n>t$). Our framework can be interpreted as a constant-round blackbox reduction of $\mbox{OT}^{n}_{t}$ (or $\mbox{OT}^{2}_{1}$) to SPH. To our knowledge, this is the first such reduction. Combining Kilian's famous completeness result, we immediately obtain a black-box reduction of SMPC to SPH.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
oblivious transfersecure multiparty computationmalicious adversariessmooth projective hashing.
Contact author(s)
zeng bing zb @ gmail com
History
2018-05-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/444
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/444,
      author = {Bing  Zeng},
      title = {Founding Cryptography on Smooth Projective Hashing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/444},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/444}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/444}
}
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