Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/439

Tight Private Circuits: Achieving Probing Security with the Least Refreshing

Sonia Belaïd and Dahmun Goudarzi and Matthieu Rivain

Abstract: Masking is a common countermeasure to secure implementations against side-channel attacks. In 2003, Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner introduced a formal security model, named t-probing model, which is now widely used to theoretically reason on the security of masked implementations. While many works have provided security proofs for small masked components, called gadgets, within this model, no formal method allowed to securely compose gadgets with a tight number of shares (namely, t + 1) until recently. In 2016, Barthe et al. filled this gap with maskComp, a tool checking the security of masking schemes composed of several gadgets. This tool can achieve provable security with tight number of shares by inserting mask-refreshing gadgets at carefully selected locations. However the method is not tight in the sense that there exists some compositions of gadgets for which it cannot exhibit a flaw nor prove the security. As a result, it is overconservative and might insert more refresh gadgets than actually needed to ensure t-probing security. In this paper, we exhibit the first tool, referred to as tightPROVE, able to clearly state whether a shared circuit composed of standard gadgets (addition, multiplication, and refresh) is t-probing secure or not. Given such a composition, our tool either produces a probing-security proof (valid at any order) or exhibits a security flaw that directly implies a probing attack at a given order. Compared to maskComp, tightPROVE can drastically reduce the number of required refresh gadgets to get a probing security proof, and thus the randomness requirement for some secure shared circuits. We apply our method to a recent AES implementation secured with higher-order masking in bitslice and we show that we can save all the refresh gadgets involved in the s-box layer, which results in an significant performance gain.

Category / Keywords: Side-channel, Masking, Composition, Private Circuits

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2018

Date: received 11 May 2018, last revised 10 Sep 2018

Contact author: sonia belaid at cryptoexperts com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180910:121019 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/439


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