Paper 2018/397
Cryptanalysis on the HHSS Obfuscation Arising from Absence of Safeguards
Jung Hee Cheon, Minki Hhan, Jiseung Kim, and Changmin Lee
Abstract
Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO) is a hopeful tool which obfuscates a program with the least-possible leakage, and produces various applications including functional encryption and deniable encryption. Recently, Halevi et. al. proposed a state-of-the-art obfuscator implementation, called HHSS obfuscation, in ACM-CCS'17. In this work, we describe a polynomial time distinguishing attack on HHSS obfuscation. In other words, we show that there exist two functionally equivalent branching programs but obfuscated programs are actually distinguishable. This attack implies that HHSS obfuscation fails to achieve a general purpose of iO security. The idea of the attack is quite simple; we multiply a left kernel vector of the branching program P to an evaluation of obfuscated matrix, which yields a small value when the program P is obfuscated. Our attack algorithm is also applicable even if evasive functions are obfuscated.
Note: Revise several parts
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- graded encoding schemeindistinguishability obfuscation
- Contact author(s)
- tory154 @ snu ac kr
- History
- 2018-05-14: last of 2 revisions
- 2018-05-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/397
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/397,
author = {Jung Hee Cheon and Minki Hhan and Jiseung Kim and Changmin Lee},
title = {Cryptanalysis on the {HHSS} Obfuscation Arising from Absence of Safeguards},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/397},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/397}
}
