Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/375

Witness Indistinguishability for any Single-Round Argument with Applications to Access Control

Zvika Brakerski and Yael Tauman Kalai

Abstract: Consider an access policy for some resource which only allows access to users of the system who own a certain set of attributes. Specifically, we consider the case where such an access structure is defined by some monotone function $f:\{0,1\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, belonging to some class of function $F$ (e.g.\ conjunctions, space bounded computation), where $N$ is the number of possible attributes.

In this work we show that any succinct single-round delegation scheme for the function class $F$ can be converted into a succinct single-round private access control protocol. That is, a verifier can be convinced that an approved user (i.e.\ one which holds an approved set of attributes) is accessing the system, without learning any additional information about the user or the set of attributes.

As a main tool of independent interest, we show that assuming a quasi-polynomially secure two-message oblivious transfer scheme with statistical sender privacy (which can be based on quasi-polynomial hardness of the DDH, QR, DCR or LWE assumptions), we can convert any single-round protocol into a witness indistinguishable one, with similar communication complexity.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / delegation, witness indistinguishability, access control

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-PKC-20

Date: received 25 Apr 2018, last revised 2 Feb 2020

Contact author: zvika brakerski at weizmann ac il

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Prior versions of this report contained an additional result about a new batch delegation scheme for monotone formulae (see ePrint history for this report). We removed that result from this work because we believe that it better fits into a different work.

Version: 20200202:083121 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/375


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