Paper 2018/365
Anonymous Distance-Bounding Identification
Ahmad Ahmadi, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Mamunur Akand
Abstract
Anonymous Distance-Bounding (DB) protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that they are within a distance bound from them, without revealing their identity. This is an attractive property that enables the prover to enjoy proximity based services, while their privacy is maintained. Combination of anonymity and distance-bounding however introduces new security challenges. We consider two new realistic attacks: a physical layer attack that uses directional antenna, and a collusion attack that involves multiple users. We show all existing anonymous DB protocols become insecure against at least one of these attacks, and then propose a new security model that captures these new attacks, and finally construct two protocols with provable security in this model. Our protocols are the only known anonymous DB protocols with provable security against known attacks.
Note: A new protocol is added compared to the conference version.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACISP 2018
- Keywords
- Distance-BoundingAnonymous AuthenticationPublic-KeyDirectional Antenna
- Contact author(s)
- ahmadi @ ucalgary ca
- History
- 2018-10-09: last of 4 revisions
- 2018-04-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/365
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/365,
author = {Ahmad Ahmadi and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Mamunur Akand},
title = {Anonymous Distance-Bounding Identification},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/365},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/365}
}
