Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/365

Anonymous Distance-Bounding Identification

Ahmad Ahmadi and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Mamunur Akand

Abstract: Anonymous Distance-Bounding (DB) protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that they are within a distance bound from them, without revealing their identity. This is an attractive property that enables the prover to enjoy proximity based services, while their privacy is maintained. Combination of anonymity and distance-bounding however introduces new security challenges. We consider two new realistic attacks: a physical layer attack that uses directional antenna, and a collusion attack that involves multiple users. We show all existing anonymous DB protocols become insecure against at least one of these attacks, and then propose a new security model that captures these new attacks, and finally construct two protocols with provable security in this model. Our protocols are the only known anonymous DB protocols with provable security against known attacks.

Category / Keywords: Distance-Bounding, Anonymous Authentication, Public-Key, Directional Antenna

Original Publication (with minor differences): ACISP 2018

Date: received 18 Apr 2018, last revised 8 Oct 2018

Contact author: ahmadi at ucalgary ca

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: A new protocol is added compared to the conference version.

Version: 20181009:030307 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/365


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]