Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/352

Cryptography with Disposable Backdoors

Kai-Min Chung and Marios Georgiou and Ching-Yi Lai and Vassilis Zikas

Abstract: Backdooring cryptographic algorithms is an indisputable taboo in the cryptographic literature for a good reason: however noble the intentions, backdoors might fall in the wrong hands, in which case security is completely compromised. Nonetheless, more and more legislative pressure is being produced to enforce the use of such backdoors.

In this work we introduce the concept of {\em disposable cryptographic backdoors} which can be used only once and become useless after that. These exotic primitives are impossible in the classical digital world without stateful and secure trusted hardware support, but, as we show, are feasible assuming quantum computation and access to classical stateless hardware tokens.

Concretely, we construct a disposable (single-use) version of message authentication codes, and use them to derive a black-box construction of stateful hardware tokens in the above setting with quantum computation and classical stateless hardware tokens. This can be viewed as a generic transformation from stateful to stateless tokens and enables, among other things, one-time programs and memories. This is to our knowledge the first provably secure construction of such primitives from stateless tokens.

As an application of disposable cryptographic backdoors we use our constructed primitive above to propose a middle-ground solution to the recent legislative push to backdoor cryptography: the conflict between Apple and FBI. We show that it is possible for Apple to create a one-time backdoor which unlocks {\em any single} device, and not even Apple can use it to unlock more than one, i.e., the backdoor becomes useless after it is used. We further describe how to use our ideas to derive a version of CCA-secure public key encryption, which is accompanied with a disposable (i.e, single-use, as in the above scenario) backdoor.

Category / Keywords: quantum cryptography

Date: received 15 Apr 2018, last revised 14 Oct 2018

Contact author: mgeorgiou at gradcenter cuny edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181014:165148 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/352


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