Paper 2018/348

Monero Ring Attack: Recreating Zero Mixin Transaction Effect

Dimaz Ankaa Wijaya, Joseph Liu, Ron Steinfeld, and Dongxi Liu

Abstract

Monero is one of the privacy-preserving cryptocurrencies employing CryptoNote protocol. The privacy features in Monero are provided by cryptographic techniques called linkable ring signature and one-time public key. Recent studies show that the majority of Monero inputs are traceable prior to mandatory RingCT transaction. After the RingCT was implemented, the problem was mitigated. We propose a novel attack to reduce the anonymity of Monero transactions or even to fully deanonymise the inputs. The proposed protocol can be launched in RingCT scenario and enable multiple attackers to collaborate without trusting each other. The attack scheme can be planted in the existing Monero services without extra fees and without putting the users’ money at risk.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
dimaz wijaya @ monash edu
History
2018-04-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/348
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/348,
      author = {Dimaz Ankaa Wijaya and Joseph Liu and Ron Steinfeld and Dongxi Liu},
      title = {Monero Ring Attack: Recreating Zero Mixin Transaction Effect},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/348},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/348}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/348}
}
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