Paper 2018/337

Invisible Sanitizable Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent

Marc Fischlin and Patrick Harasser

Abstract

Sanitizable signature schemes are signature schemes which support the delegation of modification rights. The signer can allow a sanitizer to perform a set of admissible operations on the original message and then to update the signature, in such a way that basic security properties like unforgeability or accountability are preserved. Recently, Camenisch et al. (PKC 2017) devised new schemes with the previously unattained invisibility property. This property says that the set of admissible operations for the sanitizer remains hidden from outsiders. Subsequently, Beck et al. (ACISP 2017) gave an even stronger version of this notion and constructions achieving it. Here we characterize the invisibility property in both forms by showing that invisible sanitizable signatures are equivalent to IND-CPA-secure encryption schemes, and strongly invisible signatures are equivalent to IND-CCA2-secure encryption schemes. The equivalence is established by proving that invisible (resp. strongly invisible) sanitizable signature schemes yield IND-CPA-secure (resp. IND-CCA2-secure) public-key encryption schemes and that, vice versa, we can build (strongly) invisible sanitizable signatures given a corresponding public-key encryption scheme.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. The 16th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security -- ACNS 2018
Keywords
Sanitizable signaturesInvisibilityPublic-key encryptionOne-way functionsDigital signatures
Contact author(s)
patrick harasser @ cryptoplexity de
History
2018-04-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/337
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/337,
      author = {Marc Fischlin and Patrick Harasser},
      title = {Invisible Sanitizable Signatures and Public-Key Encryption are Equivalent},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/337},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/337}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/337}
}
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