Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/329

Symbolic Side-Channel Analysis for Probabilistic Programs

Pasquale Malacaria and MHR. Khouzani and Corina S. Păsăreanu and Quoc-Sang Phan and Kasper Luckow

Abstract: In this paper we describe symbolic side-channel analysis techniques for detecting and quantifying information leakage, given in terms of Shannon and Min Entropy. Measuring the precise leakage is challenging due to the randomness and noise often present in program executions and side-channel observations. We account for this noise by introducing additional (symbolic) program inputs which are interpreted probabilistically, using symbolic execution with parameterized model counting. We also explore an approximate sampling approach for increased scalability. In contrast to typical Monte Carlo techniques, our approach works by sampling symbolic paths, representing multiple concrete paths, and uses pruning to accelerate computation and guarantee convergence to the optimal results. The key novelty of our approach is to provide bounds on the leakage that are provably under- and over-approximating the real leakage. We implemented the techniques in the Symbolic PathFinder tool and we demonstrate them on Java programs.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-Channel Attacks; Quantitative Information Flow; Symbolic Execution; Model Counting

Original Publication (with major differences): 31th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium

Date: received 2 Apr 2018, last revised 24 Apr 2018

Contact author: sphan at us fujitsu com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180424:061237 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/329


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