Paper 2018/318
Practical attacks against the Walnut digital signature scheme
Ward Beullens and Simon R. Blackburn
Abstract
Recently, NIST started the process of standardizing quantum- resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. WalnutDSA, the subject of this paper, is one of the 20 proposed signature schemes that are being considered for standardization. Walnut relies on a one-way function called E-Multiplication, which has a rich algebraic structure. This paper shows that this structure can be exploited to launch several practical attacks against the Walnut cryptosystem. The attacks work very well in practice; it is possible to forge signatures and compute equivalent secret keys for the 128-bit and 256-bit security parameters submitted to NIST in less than a second and in less than a minute respectively.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- NIST PQCpost-quantum digital signaturescryptanalysisgroup based cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- ward @ beullens com
- History
- 2018-04-04: revised
- 2018-04-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/318
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/318,
author = {Ward Beullens and Simon R. Blackburn},
title = {Practical attacks against the Walnut digital signature scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/318},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/318}
}
