Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/297

Fine-Grained Secure Computation

Matteo Campanelli and Rosario Gennaro

Abstract: This paper initiates a study of Fine Grained Secure Computation: i.e. the construction of secure computation primitives against "moderately complex" adversaries. We present definitions and constructions for compact Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Verifiable Computation secure against (non-uniform) $\mathsf{NC}^1$ adversaries. Our results do not require the existence of one-way functions and hold under a widely believed separation assumption, namely $\mathsf{NC}^1 \subsetneq \oplus \mathsf{L} / \mathsf{poly}$. We also present two application scenarios for our model: (i)hardware chips that prove their own correctness, and (ii) protocols against rational adversaries potentially relevant to the Verifier's Dilemma in smart-contracts transactions such as Ethereum.

Category / Keywords: foundations, homomorphic encryption, verifiable computation

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-TCC-2018

Date: received 27 Mar 2018, last revised 27 Oct 2018

Contact author: matteo campanelli at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Updated results.

Version: 20181027:124255 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/297


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