Paper 2018/274
G-Merkle: A Hash-Based Group Signature Scheme From Standard Assumptions
Rachid El Bansarkhani and Rafael Misoczki
Abstract
Hash-based signature schemes are the most promising cryptosystem candidates in a post-quantum world, but offer little structure to enable more sophisticated constructions such as group signatures. Group signatures allow a group member to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the whole group (as needed for anonymous remote attestation). In this work, we introduce G-Merkle, the first (stateful) hash-based group signature scheme. Our proposal relies on minimal assumptions, namely the existence of one-way functions, and offers performance equivalent to the Merkle single-signer setting. The public key size (as small as in the single-signer setting) outperforms all other post-quantum group signatures. Moreover, for $N$ group members issuing at most $B$ signatures each, the size of a hash-based group signature is just as large as a Merkle signature with a tree composed by $N\cdot B$ leaf nodes. This directly translates into fast signing and verification engines. Different from lattice-based counterparts, our construction does not require any random oracle. Note that due to the randomized structure of our Merkle tree, the signature authentication paths are pre-stored or deduced from a public tree, which seems a requirement hard to circumvent. To conclude, we present implementation results to demonstrate the practicality of our proposal.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PQ-Crypto 2018
- Keywords
- Hash-based CryptoOne-Way FunctionsGroup SignaturesPost-Quantum Crypto
- Contact author(s)
- elbansarkhani @ cdc informatik tu-darmstadt de
- History
- 2018-03-22: revised
- 2018-03-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/274
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/274, author = {Rachid El Bansarkhani and Rafael Misoczki}, title = {G-Merkle: A Hash-Based Group Signature Scheme From Standard Assumptions}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/274}, year = {2018}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/274} }