Paper 2018/267

A Note on Post-Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange from Supersingular Isogenies

Patrick Longa

Abstract

In this work, we study several post-quantum authenticated key exchange protocols in the setting of supersingular isogenies. Leveraging the design of the well-studied schemes by Krawczyk (2003), Boyd et al. (2008), Fujioka et al. (2013), Krawczyk and Wee (2015), and others, we show how to use the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) and Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) protocols as basic building blocks to construct efficient and flexible authenticated key exchange schemes featuring different functionalities and levels of security. This note is also intended to be a ``gentle'' introduction to supersingular isogeny based cryptography, and its most relevant constructions, for protocol designers and cryptographers.

Note: Includes improvements to introduction and Section 2.2.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Authenticated key exchangepost-quantum cryptographysupersingular isogeniesSIDHSIKECanetti-Krawczyk (CK) modelTLS 1.3
Contact author(s)
plonga @ microsoft com
History
2018-03-20: revised
2018-03-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/267
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/267,
      author = {Patrick Longa},
      title = {A Note on Post-Quantum Authenticated Key Exchange from Supersingular Isogenies},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/267},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/267}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/267}
}
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