Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/263

An Efficient and Secure Attribute-Based Signcryption Scheme for Smart Grid Applications

Seyyed Mahdi Sedaghat and Mohammad Hassan Ameri and Mahshid Delavar and Javad Mohajeri and Mohammad Reza Aref

Abstract: With regards to the development of modern power systems, Smart Grid (SG) as an intelligent generation of electricity networks has been faced with a tremendous attention. Fine-grained data sharing in SG plays a vital role in efficiently managing data flow in the SG. As these data commonly contain sensitive information, design of the secure and efficient privacy-preserving schemes for such networks with plenty of resource constrained devices is one of the most controversial issues. In this paper, we propose a secure Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based SignCryption (CP-ABSC) scheme which simultaneously provides the authenticity and privacy of the users by enforcing an arbitrary access control policy on encrypted data. Since the number of required pairings in the signcryption and designcryption algorithms are independent to the number of the involved attributes, the computational overhead is reduced in comparison with the existing schemes in the literature. In addition, we formally prove that the unforgeability and indistinguishability of the proposed scheme are reducible to the well-known hardness assumption of the q-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (q-BDHE) problem. Moreover, we show that embedding a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) in each smart meter will significantly reduce the storage overhead of the protocol and secure it against non-volatile memory attackers.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Smart Grid (SG), Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Signcryption (CP-ABSC) scheme, Authentication, Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)

Date: received 11 Mar 2018, withdrawn 1 Dec 2018

Contact author: sedaghat_seyyedmahdi at ee sharif edu

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20181201:131546 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/263


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