Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-checking

S. Dov Gordon, Samuel Ranellucci, and Xiao Wang

Abstract

We construct new four-party protocols for secure computation that are secure against a single malicious corruption. Our protocols can perform computations over a binary ring, and require sending just 1.5 ring elements per party, per gate. In the special case of Boolean circuits, this amounts to sending 1.5 bits per party, per gate. One of our protocols is robust, yet requires almost no additional communication. Our key technique can be viewed as a variant of the “dual execution” approach, but, because we rely on four parties instead of two, we can avoid any leakage, achieving the standard notion of security.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
malicious securityrobustness
Contact author(s)
gordon @ gmu edu
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/216

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/216,
author = {S.  Dov Gordon and Samuel Ranellucci and Xiao Wang},
title = {Secure Computation with Low Communication from Cross-checking},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/216},
year = {2018},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/216}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/216}
}

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