Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/215

Towards everlasting privacy and efficient coercion resistance in remote electronic voting

Panagiotis Grontas and Aris Pagourtzis and Alexandros Zacharakis and Bingsheng Zhang

Abstract: In this work, we propose a first version of an e-voting scheme that achieves end-to-end verifiability, everlasting privacy and efficient coercion resistance in the JCJ setting. Everlasting privacy is achieved assuming an anonymous channel, without resorting to dedicated channels between the election authorities to exchange private data. In addition, the proposed scheme achieves coercion resistance under standard JCJ assumptions. As a core building block of our scheme, we also propose a new primitive called publicly auditable conditional blind signature (PACBS), where a client receives a token from the signing server after interaction; the token is a valid signature only if a certain condition holds and the validity of the signature can only be checked by a designated verifier. We utilize this primitive to blindly mark votes under coercion in an auditable manner

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / electronic voting, end-to-end verifiability, coercion resistance, everlasting privacy, publicly auditable conditional blind signatures

Original Publication (with minor differences): 3rd Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting

Date: received 22 Feb 2018

Contact author: pgrontas at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180226:195301 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/215


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