Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/207

Non-Malleable Codes for Small-Depth Circuits

Marshall Ball and Dana Dachman-Soled and Siyao Guo and Tal Malkin and Li-Yang Tan

Abstract: We construct efficient, unconditional non-malleable codes that are secure against tampering functions computed by small-depth circuits. For constant-depth circuits of polynomial size (i.e.~$\mathsf{AC^0}$ tampering functions), our codes have codeword length $n = k^{1+o(1)}$ for a $k$-bit message. This is an exponential improvement of the previous best construction due to Chattopadhyay and Li (STOC 2017), which had codeword length $2^{O(\sqrt{k})}$. Our construction remains efficient for circuit depths as large as $\Theta(\log(n)/\log\log(n))$ (indeed, our codeword length remains $n\leq k^{1+\epsilon})$, and extending our result beyond this would require separating $\mathsf{P}$ from $\mathsf{NC^1}$.

We obtain our codes via a new efficient non-malleable reduction from small-depth tampering to split-state tampering. A novel aspect of our work is the incorporation of techniques from unconditional derandomization into the framework of non-malleable reductions. In particular, a key ingredient in our analysis is a recent pseudorandom switching lemma of Trevisan and Xue (CCC 2013), a derandomization of the influential switching lemma from circuit complexity; the randomness-efficiency of this switching lemma translates into the rate-efficiency of our codes via our non-malleable reduction.

Category / Keywords: foundations / non-malleable codes, small-depth circuit, switching lemma

Date: received 21 Feb 2018

Contact author: marshall at cs columbia edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180222:161310 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/207


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]