Paper 2018/181

Rasta: A cipher with low ANDdepth and few ANDs per bit

Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Lorenzo Grassi, Virginie Lallemand, Gregor Leander, Eik List, Florian Mendel, and Christian Rechberger

Abstract

Recent developments in multi party computation (MPC) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) promoted the design and analysis of symmetric cryptographic schemes that minimize multiplications in one way or another. In this paper, we propose with Rasta a design strategy for symmetric encryption that has ANDdepth d and at the same time only needs d ANDs per encrypted bit. Even for very low values of d between 2 and 6 we can give strong evidence that attacks may not exist. This contributes to a better understanding of the limits of what concrete symmetric-key constructions can theoretically achieve with respect to AND-related metrics, and is to the best of our knowledge the first attempt that minimizes both metrics simultaneously. Furthermore, we can give evidence that for choices of d between 4 and 6 the resulting implementation properties may well be competitive by testing our construction in the use-case of removing the large ciphertext-expansion when using the BGV scheme.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2018
Keywords
Symmetric encryptionASASAhomomorphic encryptionmultiplicative complexitymultiplicative depth
Contact author(s)
christoph dobraunig @ iaik tugraz at
History
2018-06-21: revised
2018-02-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/181
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/181,
      author = {Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Lorenzo Grassi and Virginie Lallemand and Gregor Leander and Eik List and Florian Mendel and Christian Rechberger},
      title = {Rasta: A cipher with low ANDdepth and few ANDs per bit},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/181},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/181}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/181}
}
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