Paper 2018/137
Naor-Reingold Goes Public: The Complexity of Known-key Security
Pratik Soni and Stefano Tessaro
Abstract
We study the complexity of building secure block ciphers in the setting where the key is known to the attacker. In particular, we consider two security notions with useful implications, namely public-seed pseudorandom permutations (or psPRPs, for short) (Soni and Tessaro, EUROCRYPT '17) and correlation-intractable ciphers (Knudsen and Rijmen, ASIACRYPT '07; Mandal, Seurin, and Patarin, TCC '12).
For both these notions, we exhibit constructions which make only two calls to an underlying non-invertible primitive, matching the complexity of building a pseudorandom permutation in the secret-key setting. Our psPRP result instantiates the round functions in the Naor-Reingold (NR) construction with a secure UCE hash function. For correlation intractability, we instead instantiate them from a (public) random function, and replace the pairwise-independent permutations in the NR construction with (almost)
Note: A preliminary version of this paper appears at Eurocrypt 2018.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2018
- Keywords
- known-key securitypseudorandomnesspsPRPscorrelation-intractabilitylimited independence
- Contact author(s)
- pratik_soni @ cs ucsb edu
- History
- 2018-02-07: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/137
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/137, author = {Pratik Soni and Stefano Tessaro}, title = {Naor-Reingold Goes Public: The Complexity of Known-key Security}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/137}, year = {2018}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/137} }