Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1248

Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge and Correlation Intractability from Circular-Secure FHE

Ran Canetti and Alex Lombardi and Daniel Wichs

Abstract: We construct non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments for $\mathsf{NP}$ from any circular-secure fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme. In particular, we obtain such NIZKs under a circular-secure variant of the learning with errors (LWE) problem while only assuming a standard (poly/negligible) level of security. Our construction can be modified to obtain NIZKs which are either: (1) statistically zero-knowledge arguments in the common random string model or (2) statistically sound proofs in the common reference string model.

We obtain our result by constructing a new correlation-intractable hash family [Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi, JACM~'04] for a large class of relations, which suffices to apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to specific 3-message proof systems. In particular, assuming circular secure FHE, our hash function $h$ ensures that for any function $f$ of some a-priori bounded circuit size, it is hard to find an input $x$ such that $h(x)=f(x)$. This continues a recent line of works [Holmgren and Lombardi, FOCS~'18; Canetti et al., ePrint~'18] focused on instantiating special forms of correlation intractability and Fiat-Shamir under weaker assumptions. Another consequence of our hash family construction is that, assuming circular-secure FHE, the classic quadratic residuosity protocol of [Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff, SICOMP~'89] is not zero knowledge when repeated in parallel.

We also show that, under the plain LWE assumption (without circularity), our hash family is a universal correlation intractable family for general relations, in the following sense: If there exists any hash family of some description size that is correlation-intractable for general (even inefficient) relations, then our specific construction (with a comparable size) is correlation-intractable for general (efficiently verifiable) relations.

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Date: received 31 Dec 2018, last revised 31 Dec 2018

Contact author: alexjl at mit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190103:181808 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1248


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