Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1236

Fast Secure Comparison for Medium-Sized Integers and Its Application in Binarized Neural Networks

Mark Abspoel and Niek J. Bouman and Berry Schoenmakers and Niels de Vreede

Abstract: In 1994, Feige, Kilian, and Naor proposed a simple protocol for secure $3$-way comparison of integers $a$ and $b$ from the range $[0,2]$. Their observation is that for $p=7$, the Legendre symbol $(x | p)$ coincides with the sign of $x$ for $x=a-b\in[-2,2]$, thus reducing secure comparison to secure evaluation of the Legendre symbol. More recently, in 2011, Yu generalized this idea to handle secure comparisons for integers from substantially larger ranges $[0,d]$, essentially by searching for primes for which the Legendre symbol coincides with the sign function on $[-d,d]$.

In this paper, we present new comparison protocols based on the Legendre symbol that additionally employ some form of error correction. We relax the prime search by requiring that the Legendre symbol encodes the sign function in a noisy fashion only. Practically, we use the majority vote over a window of $2k+1$ adjacent Legendre symbols, for small positive integers $k$. Our technique significantly increases the comparison range: e.g., for a modulus of $60$ bits, $d$ increases by a factor of $2.9$ (for $k=1$) and $5.4$ (for $k=2$) respectively. We give a practical method to find primes with suitable noisy encodings.

We demonstrate the practical relevance of our comparison protocol by applying it in a secure neural network classifier for the MNIST dataset. Concretely, we discuss a secure multiparty computation based on the binarized multi-layer perceptron of Hubara et al., using our comparison for the second and third layers.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / multiparty computation, secret sharing, secure comparison

Original Publication (with minor differences): CT-RSA 2019

Date: received 24 Dec 2018

Contact author: M A Abspoel at cwi nl

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181231:034122 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1236


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