Automated software protection for the masses against side-channel attacks

NICOLAS BELLEVILLE; DAMIEN COUROUSSÉ; KARINE HEYDEMANN; HENRI-PIERRE CHARLES

Paper 2018/1197

Automated software protection for the masses against side-channel attacks

NICOLAS BELLEVILLE, DAMIEN COUROUSSÉ, KARINE HEYDEMANN, and HENRI-PIERRE CHARLES

Abstract

We present an approach and a tool to answer the need for effective, generic and easily applicable protections against side-channel attacks. The protection mechanism is based on code polymorphism, so that the observable behaviour of the protected component is variable and unpredictable to the attacker. Our approach combines lightweight specialized runtime code generation with the optimization capabilities of static compilation. It is extensively configurable. Experimental results show that programs secured by our approach present strong security levels and meet the performance requirements of constrained systems.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
DOI: 10.1145/3281662
Contact author(s): nicolas belleville @ cea fr
History: 2018-12-18: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/1197
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1197,
      author = {NICOLAS BELLEVILLE and DAMIEN COUROUSSÉ and KARINE HEYDEMANN and HENRI-PIERRE CHARLES},
      title = {Automated software protection for the masses against side-channel attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1197},
      year = {2018},
      doi = {10.1145/3281662},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1197}
}