Paper 2018/1165

Identity-Concealed Authenticated Encryption and Key Exchange

Yunlei Zhao

Abstract

Identity concealment and zero-round trip time (0-RTT) connection are two of current research focuses in the design and analysis of secure transport protocols, like TLS1.3 and Google's QUIC, in the client-server setting. In this work, we introduce a new primitive for identity-concealed authenticated encryption in the public-key setting, referred to as {higncryption, which can be viewed as a novel monolithic integration of public-key encryption, digital signature, and identity concealment. We present the security definitional framework for higncryption, and a conceptually simple (yet carefully designed) protocol construction. As a new primitive, higncryption can have many applications. In this work, we focus on its applications to 0-RTT authentication, showing higncryption is well suitable to and compatible with QUIC and OPTLS, and on its applications to identity-concealed authenticated key exchange (CAKE) and unilateral CAKE (UCAKE). In particular, we make a systematic study on applying and incorporating higncryption to TLS. Of independent interest is a new concise security definitional framework for CAKE and UCAKE proposed in this work, which unifies the traditional BR and (post-ID) frameworks, enjoys composability, and ensures very strong security guarantee. Along the way, we make a systematically comparative study with related protocols and mechanisms including Zheng's signcryption, one-pass HMQV, QUIC, TLS1.3 and OPTLS, most of which are widely standardized or in use.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.ACM CCS 2016
Keywords
key exchangeidentity privacyTLS
Contact author(s)
ylzhao @ fudan edu cn
History
2018-12-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/1165
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1165,
      author = {Yunlei Zhao},
      title = {Identity-Concealed Authenticated Encryption  and Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/1165},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1165}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1165}
}
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