Paper 2018/1151

Analysis Of The Simulatability Of An Oblivious Transfer

Bing Zeng

Abstract

In the Journal of Cryptology (25(1): 158-193. 2012), Shai Halevi and Yael Kalai proposed a general framework for constructing two-message oblivious transfer protocols using smooth projective hashing. The authors asserts that this framework gives a simulation-based security guarantee when the sender is corrupted. Later this work has been believed to be half-simulatable in literatures. In this paper, we show that the assertion is not true and present our ideas to construct a fully-simulatable oblivious transfer framework.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
oblivious transfersecure multiparty computationmalicious adversariessmooth projective hashing
Contact author(s)
zeng bing zb @ gmail com
History
2018-12-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/1151
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1151,
      author = {Bing Zeng},
      title = {Analysis Of The Simulatability Of An Oblivious Transfer},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/1151},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1151}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1151}
}
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