Paper 2018/1151
Analysis Of The Simulatability Of An Oblivious Transfer
Bing Zeng
Abstract
In the Journal of Cryptology (25(1): 158-193. 2012), Shai Halevi and Yael Kalai proposed a general framework for constructing two-message oblivious transfer protocols using smooth projective hashing. The authors asserts that this framework gives a simulation-based security guarantee when the sender is corrupted. Later this work has been believed to be half-simulatable in literatures. In this paper, we show that the assertion is not true and present our ideas to construct a fully-simulatable oblivious transfer framework.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- oblivious transfersecure multiparty computationmalicious adversariessmooth projective hashing
- Contact author(s)
- zeng bing zb @ gmail com
- History
- 2018-12-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/1151
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1151,
author = {Bing Zeng},
title = {Analysis Of The Simulatability Of An Oblivious Transfer},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1151},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1151}
}
