A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model

S.  Sharmila Deva Selvi; Arinjita Paul; C.  Pandu Rangan

Paper 2018/1136

A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model

S. Sharmila Deva Selvi, Arinjita Paul, and C. Pandu Rangan

Abstract

Proxy re-encryption (PRE) enables delegation of decryption rights by entrusting a proxy server with special information, that allows it to transform a ciphertext under one public key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different public key. It is important to note that, the proxy which performs the re-encryption learns nothing about the message encrypted under either public keys. Due to its transformation property, proxy re-encryption schemes have practical applications in distributed storage, encrypted email forwarding, Digital Rights Management (DRM) and cloud storage. From its introduction, several proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature, and a majority of them have been realized using bilinear pairing. In Africacrypt 2010, the first PKI-based collusion resistant CCA secure PRE scheme without pairing was proposed in the random oracle model. In this paper, we point out an important weakness in the scheme. We also present the first collusion-resistant pairing-free unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme which meets CCA security under a variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman hardness assumption in the random oracle model.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. 16th International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2017)
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_21
Keywords: Proxy Re-Encryption Random Oracle Model Chosen Ciphertext Security provably secure unidirectional.
Contact author(s): arinjita paul @ gmail com
History: 2019-11-22: revised; 2018-11-29: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/1136
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1136,
      author = {S.  Sharmila Deva Selvi and Arinjita Paul and C.  Pandu Rangan},
      title = {A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1136},
      year = {2018},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_21},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1136}
}