Paper 2018/1136

A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model

S. Sharmila Deva Selvi, Arinjita Paul, and C. Pandu Rangan


Proxy re-encryption (PRE) enables delegation of decryption rights by entrusting a proxy server with special information, that allows it to transform a ciphertext under one public key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different public key. It is important to note that, the proxy which performs the re-encryption learns nothing about the message encrypted under either public keys. Due to its transformation property, proxy re-encryption schemes have practical applications in distributed storage, encrypted email forwarding, Digital Rights Management (DRM) and cloud storage. From its introduction, several proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature, and a majority of them have been realized using bilinear pairing. In Africacrypt 2010, the first PKI-based collusion resistant CCA secure PRE scheme without pairing was proposed in the random oracle model. In this paper, we point out an important weakness in the scheme. We also present the first collusion-resistant pairing-free unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme which meets CCA security under a variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman hardness assumption in the random oracle model.

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.16th International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security (CANS 2017)
Proxy Re-EncryptionRandom Oracle ModelChosen Ciphertext Securityprovably secureunidirectional.
Contact author(s)
arinjita paul @ gmail com
2019-11-22: revised
2018-11-29: received
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      author = {S.  Sharmila Deva Selvi and Arinjita Paul and C.  Pandu Rangan},
      title = {A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/1136},
      year = {2018},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-02641-7_21},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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