Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1082

Deterministic Cube Attacks: A New Method to Recover Superpolies in Practice

Chen-Dong Ye and Tian Tian

Abstract: Cube attacks are an important type of key recovery attacks against NFSR-based cryptosystems. The key step in cube attacks closely related to key recovery is recovering superpolies. However, in the previous well-known cube attacks including original, division property based, and correlation cube attacks, the algebraic normal forms of superpolies could hardly be proved to be exact, which involves a small failure probability or unpractical computations. In this paper, we propose a new variant of cube attacks called deterministic cube attacks, which aims at recovering the exact algebraic normal forms of superpolies efficiently and practically. These new attacks are developed based on degree evaluation method proposed by Liu in CRYPTO2017. We apply our new cube attacks to the round-reduced Trivium. As a result, we recover the exact algebraic normal forms of some superpolies for the 818-, 819-, 837-, and 838-round Trivium. By the way, it is proved that the best cube of size 37 given by Liu in CRYPTO2017 is not a zero-sum distinguisher but a zero-biased distinguisher by recovering its exact superpoly for the first time. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that superpolies of cubes with the sizes less than 40 could be practically recovered for Trivium up to 838 rounds. Hopefully, our new attacks would provide some new insights on cube attacks against NFSR-based ciphers.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Trivium, cube attacks, key recovery attack, deterministic algorithms

Date: received 7 Nov 2018

Contact author: ye_chendong at 126 com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181109:164700 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1082


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