Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/106

On the Gold Standard for Security of Universal Steganography

Sebastian Berndt and Maciej Liśkiewicz

Abstract: While symmetric-key steganography is quite well understood both in the information-theoretic and in the computational setting, many fundamental questions about its public-key counterpart resist persistent attempts to solve them. The computational model for public-key steganography was proposed by von Ahn and Hopper in EUROCRYPT 2004. At TCC 2005, Backes and Cachin gave the first universal public-key stegosystem - i.e. one that works on all channels - achieving security against replayable chosen-covertext attacks (SS-RCCA) and asked whether security against non-replayable chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) is achievable. Later, Hopper (ICALP 2005) provided such a stegosystem for every efficiently sampleable channel, but did not achieve universality. He posed the question whether universality and SS-CCA-security can be achieved simultaneously. No progress on this question has been achieved since more than a decade. In our work we solve Hopper's problem in a somehow complete manner: As our main positive result we design an SS-CCA-secure stegosystem that works for every memoryless channel. On the other hand, we prove that this result is the best possible in the context of universal steganography. We provide a family of 0-memoryless channels - where the already sent documents have only marginal influence on the current distribution - and prove that no SS-CCA-secure steganography for this family exists in the standard non-look-ahead model.

Category / Keywords: foundations / Eurocrypt 2018, steganography, public-key cryptography

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-EUROCRYPT-2018

Date: received 29 Jan 2018

Contact author: sebastian berndt at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20180130:211622 (All versions of this report)

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