Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1047

A Key Leakage Preventive White-box Cryptographic Implementation

Seungkwang Lee and Nam-su Jho and Myungchul Kim

Abstract: A white-box cryptographic implementation is to defend against white-box attacks that allow access and modification of memory or internal resources in the computing device. In particular, linear and non-linear transformations applied to this table-based cryptographic implementation is used to prevent key-dependent intermediate values from being seen by white-box attackers. However, it has been shown that there is a correlation before and after the linear and non-linear transformations so that even a gray-box attacker can reveal secret keys hidden in a white-box cryptographic implementation. In this paper, we focus on the problem of linear transformations including the characteristics of block invertible binary matrices and the distribution of intermediate values. Our experimental results and proof show that the balanced distribution of the key-dependent intermediate value is the main cause of key leakage. Based on this observation, we find out that a random byte insertion in the intermediate values before linear transformations can eliminate a problematic correlation to the key, and propose our white-box AES implementation using this principle. Our proposed implementations reduce the memory requirement by at most 33 percent compared to the masked implementations and also slightly reduce the number of table lookups. In addition, our method is a non-masking technique and does not require a static or dynamic random source, unlike the existing gray-box (power analysis) countermeasures.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / white-box cryptography, gray-box attacks

Date: received 29 Oct 2018, last revised 11 Nov 2018

Contact author: skwang at etri re kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181111:084353 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1047


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