Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1044

Strongly Unforgeable Signatures Resilient to Polynomially Hard-to-Invert Leakage under Standard Assumptions

Masahito Ishizaka and Kanta Matsuura

Abstract: A signature scheme is said to be weakly unforgeable, if it is hard to forge a signature on a message not signed before. A signature scheme is said to be strongly unforgeable, if it is hard to forge a signature on any message. In some applications, the weak unforgeability is not enough and the strong unforgeability is required, e.g., the Canetti, Halevi and Katz transformation.

Leakage-resilience is a property which guarantees that even if secret information such as the secret-key is partially leaked, the security is maintained. Some security models with leakage-resilience have been proposed. The hard-to-invert leakage model, a.k.a. auxiliary (input) leakage model, proposed by Dodis et al. at STOC'09 is especially meaningful one, since the leakage caused by a function which information-theoretically reveals the secret-key, e.g., one-way permutation, is considered.

In this work, we propose a generic construction of digital signature strongly unforgeable and resilient to polynomially hard-to-invert leakage which can be instantiated under standard assumptions such as the decisional linear assumption. We emphasize that our instantiated signature is not only the first one resilient to polynomially hard-to-invert leakage under standard assumptions, but also the first one which is strongly unforgeable and has hard-to-invert leakage-resilience.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Digital signature, Strong existential unforgeability, Leakage-resilience, Hard-to-invert leakage, Auxiliary(-input) leakage.

Original Publication (with major differences): 21st Information Security Conference (ISC2018)
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-99136-8_23

Date: received 29 Oct 2018, last revised 29 Oct 2018

Contact author: ishimasa at iis u-tokyo ac jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20181102:005708 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1044


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