Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1033

One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies

Atsushi Fujioka and Katsuyuki Takashima and Kazuki Yoneyama

Abstract: We propose two one-round authenticated group-key exchange protocols from newly employed cryptographic invariant maps (CIMs): one is secure under the quantum random oracle model and the other resists against maximum exposure where a non-trivial combination of secret keys is revealed. The security of the former (resp. latter) is proved under the n-way decisional Diffie-Hellman (resp. n-way gap Diffie-Hellman) assumption on the CIMs in the quantum random (resp. random) oracle model. We instantiate the proposed protocols on the hard homogeneous spaces with limitation where the number of the user group is two. In particular, the protocols instantiated by using the CSIDH, commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman, key exchange are currently more realistic than the general n-party CIM-based ones due to its implementability. Our two-party one-round protocols are secure against quantum adversaries.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / one-round authenticated group key exchange, cryptographic invariant maps, hard homogeneous spaces, commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie--Hellman, G-CK model, G-CK^+ model, quantum adversary

Original Publication (with major differences): ProvSec 2019 (short paper)

Date: received 23 Oct 2018, last revised 1 Nov 2019

Contact author: Takashima Katsuyuki at aj MitsubishiElectric co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191102:020603 (All versions of this report)

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