Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/1019

Decentralized Evaluation of Quadratic Polynomials on Encrypted Data

Chloé Hébant and Duong Hieu Phan and David Pointcheval

Abstract: Since the seminal paper on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) by Gentry in 2009, a lot of work and improvements have been proposed, with an amazing number of possible applications. It allows outsourcing any kind of computations on encrypted data, and thus without leaking any information to the provider who performs the computations. This is quite useful for many sensitive data (finance, medical, etc.).

Unfortunately, FHE fails at providing some computation on private inputs to a third party, in cleartext: the user that can decrypt the result is able to decrypt the inputs. A classical approach to allow limited decryption power is distributed decryption. But none of the actual FHE schemes allows distributed decryption, at least with an efficient protocol.

In this paper, we revisit the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryptosystem, and the Freeman's variant, that allow evaluation of quadratic polynomials, or any 2-DNF formula. Whereas the BGN scheme relies on integer factoring for the trapdoor in the composite-order group, and thus possesses one public/secret key only, the Freeman's scheme can handle multiple users with one general setup that just needs to define a pairing-based algebraic structure. We show that it can be efficiently decentralized, with an efficient distributed key generation algorithm, without any trusted dealer, but also efficient distributed decryption and distributed re-encryption, in a threshold setting. We then provide some applications of computations on encrypted data, without central authority.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Decentralization, FHE, 2-DNF

Original Publication (with minor differences): Information Security Conference, ISC 2019

Date: received 19 Oct 2018, last revised 3 Jul 2019

Contact author: duong-hieu phan at unilim fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190703:114616 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/1019


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