Paper 2018/047

The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA

Boris Ryabko and Aleksandr Soskov


The purpose of the work is to estimate the resistance of lightweight block ciphers Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT, LEA to a distinguishing attack. (This attack is a form of cryptanalysis on data encrypted by a cipher that allows an attacker to distinguish the encrypted data from random data.) Modern lightweight block ciphers must be designed to be immune to such an attack. It turned out that Speck, Simon, HIGHT and LEA showed a sufficient resistance to the distinguishing attack, but Simeck with 48-bit block size and 96-bit key size was not immune to this attack.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
boris @ ryabko net
2018-01-15: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Boris Ryabko and Aleksandr Soskov},
      title = {The distinguishing attack on Speck, Simon, Simeck, HIGHT and LEA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/047},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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